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Abstract—The Information Centric Networking (ICN) model
relies on the ubiquitous use of caching to improve performance
and reduce bandwidth requirements. ICN also makes it possible
for routers to fetch content from downstream nodes, such as
when a content for a home user is fetched from a neighbor’s
home router, with significant performance improvement. This
paper shows how an attacker using compromised hosts can
easily gather a massive amount of low-cost, low-latency storage
for malware, junk, and other attacker-controlled content. We
conclude by considering a possible countermeasure, a blacklist
fed by a honeypot, which we show to be effective.
Index Terms—Information Centric Networking; Named Data
Networking; ndnSIM; Cache Pollution; False Locality; Honey-
pot;
I. INTRODUCTION
The Information Centric Networking (ICN) framework is
emerging as a way to improve the performance of content
delivery by leveraging on the pervasive use of caching. The
ICN approach is used in several proposals and prototypes,
among which the Content Centric Networking (CCN) protocol
[1] and the Named Data Networking (NDN) project [2], to
name a few. ICN nodes choose what content to keep in their
Content Stores, the name used in CCN for caches, according
to some reactive policy. This is an important difference with
respect to the pre-provision algorithms of standard Content
Delivery Networks. Thus, the information centric paradigm
provides a more neutral service to the user, but leaves room
for a malicious user to implement entirely new attacks to
the cache management process. The literature identifies two
broad classes of attacks: cache pollution attacks, in which the
attacker forces an ICN node to keep unpopular contents in its
cache in order to exhaust it [3], [4] and cache snooping, in
which the cached content is used to get information about the
downstream users [5], [6].
To our knowledge, most of the research on cache pollution
attacks has focused on Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. This
paper shows that attackers can do more and build a large stor-
age network that can be used to store junk content, malware,
and in general any kind of attacker-controlled content. This
storage is naturally very near to the end user and can be
exploited to serve such content with low latency. This ability
provides a clear economic incentive for the adversary, and thus
makes this kind of attack especially attractive.
In our scenario, the attacker creates a false locality into
the user caches by using compromised nodes to send a high
number of requests for specific content objects. This way, the
attacker can quickly spread its contents towards peripheral
nodes. The attacker has an incentive in this attack because it
can rent this storage to producers who, for any reason, cannot
invest in infrastructure.
The attack is particularly effective when the network ex-
ploits the ability of CCN nodes of looking for content across
several interfaces using for example a Nearest Replica Routing
(NRR) as shown in [7]. A typical example would be an access
network in which end-users are equipped with CCN set-top
boxes. In such scenario, the access nodes could retrieve content
objects requested by a user from the set-top box of another user
in a peer-to-peer fashion, thus greatly enhancing the caching
ability of the access network and reducing the bandwidth
requirement of the core network. By exploiting the low cache
churn rate of low-activity users, the attacker can easily obtain
control of a large fraction of the storage available at these
users’ premises.
The next Section II reviews some of the related work about
cache pollution attacks. The attacker model with its goals and
capabilities is presented in Section III. While, the Section IV
shows the evaluation scenario together with the parameters
used for the attack analysis presented in the following Section
V. In Section VI, we suggest a countermeasure to mitigate the
attack. We conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The cache pollution attacks are not new in the networking
scenario. Since proxy caching servers are widespread in the
IP-based networks, a DoS attack is easy to deploy. The
paper [8] presents false-locality and locality-disruption attacks
and efficient methods to detect them. A false-locality attack
happens when the adversary continuously requests the same
set of files, creating a false file locality at the caches. Instead,
in a locality-disruption attack, the attacker generates requests
for otherwise unpopular content. The authors suggest to use
a metric, the byte damage ratio, to measure the effects of
the previous attacks. Then, they describe how to detect and
mitigate such pollution attacks. Although the paper is not
focused on ICN, it is a starting point for our work.
The cache pollution attacks on CCN are investigated in [9].978-1-4673-7306-7/15/$31.00 c© 2015 IEEE
The authors try to make caching in CCN more robust using a
proactive mechanism called CacheShield. This mechanism is
based on a shielding function that computes the probability for
each content to be cached. Thus, the unpopular contents are
excluded from caching. The solution is evaluated under dif-
ferent attacks in various network topologies. However, the ef-
fectiveness is limited to the scenarios taken into consideration.
Instead, the paper [10] illustrates the inefficacy of CacheShield
against realistic adversaries. The authors also present a new
lightweight detection method for cache pollution attacks. The
mechanism is tested with simulations and provides accurate
results in different topologies. Nonetheless, the paper does not
suggest countermeasures against this kind of attacks.
Another problem related to the caches is the content poi-
soning, as presented in [11]. In a content poisoning attack,
the adversary injects junk content into the router caches. The
paper analyzes the problem and suggests a ranking algorithm
that allows routers to make decisions about the content validity.
Instead, our paper does not consider the content validity but
the problem of spreading attacker-controlled contents in the
network caches.
As far as we know, our paper is the first that considers the
attractiveness and the effectiveness of a cache pollution attack
that aims to build an attacker-controlled Content Delivery
Network. Moreover, our work highlights the incentive for
the adversary in improving the caching ability of the access
network and reducing the bandwidth requirement of the core
network.
III. ATTACK DESCRIPTION
Our attacker is an entity whose goal is distributing content
objects into end user storage, therefore the network can
provide those contents with low latency to users asking for
them. The attacker focuses its effort on the content objects
whose name is in a list A.
The attacker entity has the capability to compromise a
set of consumer nodes, creating a botnet under its control.
Particularly, the attacker can command:
• the frequency of requests sent by the compromised nodes
and the distribution of the requests;
• the names of contents to be requested.
However, the attacker cannot change the cache size and the
parameters related to the non compromised traffic: a com-
promised node sends interests according to the node owner’s
requests in addition to the attacker-controlled requests. Also,
it is not able to compromise the router nodes, in particular it
cannot modify their routing tables and Content Stores.
In order to prevent detection, the attacker must avoid
starving the legitimate requests, therefore it should find a trade-
off between its gain and the service degradation caused to the
compromised nodes. We do not discuss how to find this trade-
off, but evaluate the attack success depending on the number
of compromised nodes.
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Fig. 1. The network topology
IV. EVALUATION SCENARIO
To evaluate the impact of the attack, we consider the
network scenario shown in Figure 1, in which the users have
the following roles:
Producer 1. Its Content Store contains all and only the
content objects whose name prefix is /prefix1. We assume
that the names in list A are a subset of the names starting with
this prefix.
Producer 2. Its Content Store contains all and only the
content objects whose name prefix is /prefix2.
Monitored Consumer. It sends interests for objects whose
name starts with prefix1 with a probability according to the
Zipf’s law. Consequently, this Consumer may ask for contents
in A or not.
Terminal Nodes. They request contents whose name starts
with prefix2 following the Zipf’s distribution. Additionally,
one or more of these nodes can be compromised. A Compro-
mised Node (CN) also requests contents from A.
Routers. They forward interests and data packets using a
simplified version of the NRR policy. When a router receives
a data packet with name n from the downstream interface i,
it adds the interface i to its FIB as the next hop for n. Then,
when an interests arrives for n, and n is not in the Content
Store, the router forwards the interest towards i. If, after a
short timeout, the corresponding data packet does not arrive,
the interest is forwarded upstream towards the Producer and
the association (n, i) is removed from the FIB.
V. ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this Section, we answer the following questions:
1) Can the producer take advantage from the attack and
how can we measure this advantage?
2) What are the network conditions that mostly influence
the benefits for the attacker?
3) How much the performance of the compromised node
is decreased?
We compare different attacker’s strategies for choosing the
most convenient set of nodes to compromise to reach the goal
presented in Section III.
We conduct simulations using the open-source ndnSIM
package [12], which implements the NDN protocol stack for
the ns-3 network simulator. The simulations last 7200 s, after
reaching the steady state. The shown results have a confidence
of 95% or better.
We evaluate four scenarios that differ for the lack or
presence of caches in the router nodes and for the RTT (Round
Trip Time) between Users and Producers:
A. a short range network with RTT = 30 ms,
B. a long range network with RTT = 130 ms,
Both the scenarios can have the following cache configura-
tions:
1. router content stores have negligible size.
2. both users and routers have content stores.
The link between each pair of nodes is 1 Gbit/s to avoid
bottlenecks. Moreover, we suppose that the links do not
introduce errors during transmission. The content catalog of
each Producer comprises 10000 content objects. Each content
has a size of 1000 bytes. The Content Store of the Monitored
Consumer and of the Routers can store 100 contents, that is
the 0.5% of the total. The Terminal Nodes have Content Stores
of size 600 contents. All the Content Stores use a LRU policy,
as mostly assumed by the literature [13], [14], [15].
The Monitored Consumer sends interests for content with
name prefix prefix1 following the Zipf’s distribution with
α = 0.9 and request rate λC = 100 interests per second. The
names in A correspond to the 1000 most popular objects with
this prefix.
The Terminal Nodes request content with name prefix
prefix2 with rate λCN and with names chosen according to
the Zipf’s law. If a node is compromised, then it also requests
contents from A with rate µ = 10 interests per second.
The names are chosen uniformly from A. We define a cache
contention parameter, C, as the ratio between the legitimate
requests and the attacker-controlled requests: C = λCN/µ. In
order to avoid detection, the attacker must keep its request rate
low, therefore we will only consider scenarios in which C ≥ 1.
In the following, we depict results relative to C = 1, 5, 10,
meaning that λCN = 10, 50, 100.
A. Effectiveness of the Attack
Figure 2 shows the latency perceived by the Monitored
Consumer in retrieving the 1000 most popular contents versus
the cache contention, C, which measures the ratio between
the legitimate traffic and the attacker-controlled traffic at the
compromised nodes. Results are shown for different numbers
of Terminal Nodes that become Compromised Nodes (CN).
With no compromised nodes, the latency is about 18 ms, the
delay remains constant and it is higher than the other scenarios.
Whereas, in presence of the attack, the delay increases with an
higher level of contention, i.e. when the attack is less obvious.
However, even with a high contention, the latency is always
lower than the values of the scenario without the attack. Thus,
this figure shows that the attacker gets an advantage in pushing
the content it controls towards the consumers.
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Fig. 2. Latency perceived by the Monitored Consumer.
Scenario A1: RTT=30ms, negligible Router caches.
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Fig. 3. Hit Ratio at the Monitored Consumer.
Scenario A1: RTT=30ms, negligible Router caches.
Figure 3 shows the cache hit ratio measured at the Mon-
itored Consumer versus the cache contention, C. With no
attack, the hit ratio is about 0.4.
In case of attack, the requests for attacker-controlled con-
tents from the compromised nodes are routed also to the
Monitored Consumer, increasing their perceived popularity
and making them stay longer in the Content Store. When the
attacker-controlled traffic is high (C = 1), the hit ratio grows
significantly, to about 0.8 with a single compromised node
up to almost 1 with three compromised nodes, meaning that
attacker-controlled traffic is unlikely to be pushed out of the
Content Store. Clearly, this behavior becomes weaker as the
attack intensity decreases. With C = 10 and two or three
compromised nodes, the effect of the attack on the Content
Store of the Monitored Consumer can still be observed, while
with a single compromised node, the effect of the attack is
negligible.
Figure 4 presents the latency perceived by the Terminal
Nodes in retrieving content from Producer 2, versus the cache
contention, C. Results are shown for different numbers of
Compromised Nodes (CN).
During the attack, the Terminal Nodes are forced to request
content from Producer 1 and the perceived latency relative
to content retrieved from Producer 2 grows. If the Terminal
Nodes are not compromised, the latency is about 9 ms. In case
of attack, the latency is always larger, showing that the attack
bestows worse performance on the affected nodes. Clearly,
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Fig. 4. Latency perceived by the Terminal Nodes.
Scenario A1: RTT=30ms, negligible Router caches.
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Fig. 5. Hit Ratio at the Terminal Nodes.
Scenario A1: RTT=30ms, negligible Router caches.
the latency decreases with a weaker attack, specifically with
C = 10 the service degradation is small and the attacker might
be more difficult to detect.
Figure 5 shows the cache hit ratio measured at the Terminal
Nodes depending on cache contention, C. Results are shown
for different numbers of Compromised Nodes (CN).
With no attack, the hit ratio is about 0.7. In case of
attack, the hit ratio decreases due to the additional requests
for attacker-controlled content. With an higher percentage of
attacker-controlled traffic, the hit ratio lowers significantly up
to about 0.5. While, with C = 10 the effect of the attack on
the Compromised Nodes hit ratio is negligible. As it can be
noticed, both the perceived latency by the Terminal Nodes and
the hit ratio are inversely proportional to the perceived latency
by the Monitored Consumer and its hit ratio, meaning that the
better the service perception for the Monitored Consumer, the
higher the service degradation for the Terminal Nodes.
Figure 6 describes the number of content packets sent per
second by the Producer 1 versus the cache contention, C and
for different numbers of Compromised Nodes (CN).
With no attack, the number of packets sent per second is
around 75 packets/s. This number decreases when the Terminal
Nodes start sending interest for attacker-controlled content. In
particular, the smaller the number of Compromised Nodes, the
smaller the number of content packets sent by the Producer
1. For example, the value with one Compromised Node is
about 45 packets/s. As it can be expected, the results do
1 5 10
40
50
60
70
Cache Contention, C
D
at
a
Pa
ck
et
s/
Se
co
nd no-CN
1 CN
2 CNs
3 CNs
Fig. 6. Number of contents sent by the Producer 1.
Scenario A1: RTT=30ms, negligible Router caches.
not depend on the cache contention because the rate for the
attacker-controlled contents, µ, is constant. Thus, this figure
clearly depicts that the attacker, i.e. the malicious Producer,
has benefits in terms of bandwidth savings. Indeed, the Com-
promised Nodes become responsible for pushing content to
the requesting Consumer instead of the malicious Producer.
The previous results prove that it is possible for a malicious
Producer to launch an attack in order to improve the user
experience and to reduce the bandwidth and storage require-
ments of the core network. In the previous setups, it is possible
to get both the advantages with an appropriate choice of the
network parameters. In particular, the Producer can choose the
number of Terminal Nodes to compromise, and the percentage
of attacker-controller traffic. At a glance, if C = 1, the
scenario seems the most advantageous. Indeed, the number
of deliveries by the Producer is smaller, and the perceived
latency by the Monitored Consumer is decreased more than
the scenario with no attack. However, the performance relative
to the Terminal Nodes are worse, and consequently the attack
is easily noticeable. Thus, the Producer should find a trade-off
between the advantages and the possibility to be detected.
B. Results for Scenario B1
This scenario assumes RTT = 130 ms, and negligible caches
in the router nodes.
The results are similar to the scenario A1 presented in
subsection V-A. Figure 7 shows the metric relative to the
latency perceived by the Monitored Consumer. The latency
trend is constant with no attack and is about 80 ms. Also, the
more the attacker-controlled traffic and the bigger the number
of Compromised Nodes, the smaller the latency perceived by
the Monitored Consumer. Thus, we can conclude that also if
the distance, in terms of RTT, between the end nodes and
the Producer is bigger, the attacker can launch an attack, that
results to be effective, by controlling the behavior of some
nodes.
We do not show the results for the scenarios A2 and B2
where router nodes have bigger caches, which provide similar
figures and allow drawing similar conclusions.
Overall, the Producer can always take advantage from the
attacker-controller traffic requested by the Terminal Nodes.
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Fig. 7. Latency perceived by the Monitored Consumer.
Scenario B1: RTT=130ms, negligible Router caches.
However, it has to consider different aspects. First, it can
choose to compromise only one Terminal Node with a small
cache contention. In that case, the number of delivered con-
tents is reduced, the latency perceived by the Monitored Con-
sumer is lowered and consequently the hit ratio is increased.
Nevertheless, the Compromised Nodes performance are worse
than the other scenarios. Thus, the Producer could consider to
compromise one or two Terminal Node(s) with medium cache
contention, in order to take advantage and also to not be easily
detected.
As a conclusion, we can assert that the malicious producer,
exploiting the presented attack, can significantly increase its
performance in terms of throughput. Thus, performing a attack
can make a Producer save a significant bandwidth in the
network. The number of Compromised Nodes and their cache
contention, C, influence the results. In particular, the more
beneficial is the effect on the Consumer, the more negative
is the effect on the Terminal Nodes performance. Finally, the
cache size and their location also provide advantages.
VI. ATTACK MITIGATION
The previous Section shows how the attacker can exploit
the ICN principles to pile up an attacker-controlled storage.
In this Section, we suggest a simple countermeasure based on
the idea that the list of names in A can be identified by means
of a honeypot, and the nearest replica routing can be turned
off for the identified names.
We install a honeypot over the Terminal Node 1, which we
assume to have been compromised by deducing it from the
degradation of its performance. This node also hides a moni-
toring station that collects the attacker-controlled requests. The
list of these requests is then sent to Router 1 and stored in
a blacklist. Thus, for the contents in this list, the standard
NDN routing is used, instead of the modified one that exploits
the nearest replica routing, thus reducing or eliminating the
attacker’s gain.
We evaluate the proposed countermeasure by means of
simulations with ndnSIM. We consider the scenario A1 with
RTT = 30ms, negligible caches in the routers, and C = 1.
Differently from the evaluation scenario in the previous Sec-
tion, we assume that the Terminal Node 1 does not make
any legitimate request and, as a consequence, all the requests
coming from that node are malicious, i.e. for content from
A. In order to simulate the blacklist collection and the choice
of the forwarding algorithm on the basis of the blacklist, we
compute the a-priori probability for a malicious content to be
in the blacklist, Pr(Bl). Whenever an interest packet arrives
for an attacker-controlled content, the Router 1 chooses to
use the standard NDN routing with a probability Pr(Bl),
otherwise it uses the nearest replica routing. First, we find the
average number of contents in the blacklist, NBl, as follows:
NBl = E[Pois(µT )] =
e−µT
µT !
.
The number of contents in the blacklist depends on a Poisson’s
distribution Pois(µT ), where µ is the request rate and T is
the monitoring window, meaning that every T seconds the
blacklist is updated and sent to the Router node.
Then, we compute the probability, Pr(Bl), as:
Pr(Bl) =
NBl
|A| =
µT
|A| = 1− (1−
1
|A| )
µT .
Assuming µ = 10 interest/s, T = 120s, |A| = 1000, we
get Pr(Bl) ' 0, 7. Thus, for contents in the blacklist there
is a probability of 70% to be routed using the standard
NDN routing instead of the nearest replica routing. Then,
considering a monitoring window of T = 230s, we get
Pr(Bl) ' 0, 9, which corresponds to a probability of 90%.
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Fig. 8. Latency perceived by the Monitored Consumer in retrieving the
attacker-controlled contents before the attack, during the attack and with
the attack using the mitigation technique depending on the number of
Compromised Nodes.
We measure the latency perceived by the Monitored Con-
sumer in retrieving the attacker-controlled contents versus the
number of Compromised Nodes (CN). The results are pre-
sented in Figure 8 for the different scenarios: with no attack,
with attack, and with attack using the proposed mitigation
technique.
The red square represents the latency perceived by the
Monitored Consumer with no attack, and it is a little more
than 18 ms, as already shown in Figure 2. While, the latency
perceived during the attack is represented by the blue dots
and decreases with the number of Compromised Nodes. The
Figure highlights an improvement of about 20% relative to the
scenario without the attack. Finally, we represent the perceived
latency after exploiting the countermeasure to mitigate the
attack, the results are depicted with the black triangles. In that
case, the results do not depend on the number of Compromised
Nodes. We notice that the latency goes near the scenario
without the attack, i.e. the latency is about 17 ms for T = 120s
and about 18ms for T = 230s. Thus, the improvement
becomes of only 5% or 2%, respectively. We recall that we
choose a monitoring window of T = 120s or of T = 230s,
that leads to a probability of 70% and of 90% for a content to
be in the blacklist. Overall, we can conclude saying that the
countermeasure is effective in reducing the attacker’s incentive
by decreasing its gain. If we enlarged the monitoring window,
we would get a bigger probability and so we could bring
back the perceived latency to the case without the attack.
This means that the attacker completely looses its gain, as
expected. Thus, it has no incentives in taking the control of
the Terminal Node(s) for requesting its contents becoming a
simple DoS attack. This, however, comes at the expense of
higher complexity and less robustness to changing conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that, under realistic assumptions on the
attacker ability, the ICN paradigm can be exploited by ma-
licious users to take control of a large amount of storage
near the end-user. This storage can be used to propagate junk,
malware, or other content with low latency without requiring
any investment in infrastructure. By means of simulations, we
show that the attack is particularly effective, providing the
attacker with bandwidth savings and excellent performance in
exchange for a limited effort.
Fortunately, there are some countermeasures that can be
used to reduce the effectiveness and thus, the attractiveness
of the attack. In particular, we show with simulations that a
monitoring station, i.e. a honeypot, can significantly alleviate
the issue by sending a blacklist of contents likely to be
attacker-controlled to the routers nodes.
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